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THE QUESTION OF AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY AND KWASI 
wm.EDU'S PHILOSOPHY AND AN AFRICAN CULTURE 
Keith J. Ansell-Pearson 
It. is the function of our own and every 
age to grasp the knowledge which 
is already existing, to make it our own, 
and in so doing to develop it still further 
and to raise it to a higher level. (1) 
Discussions of African philosophy, over the role and 
function it is to play in an African culture, have tended 
over the past decade or so to centre around the question 
of the very possibility and intelligibility of a notion of African 
philosophy. The reasons for this concentration are not hard 
to find. As Kwasi Wiredu succinctly puts it in the introduction 
to his Philosophy and an African Culture (Cambridge 
University Press, 1980): "The search for the correct 
conception of African philosophy is part of the post-colonial 
African quest for identity." African philosophers have 
recognised that the political quest for self-determination 
is inseparable from the broader philosophical and intellectual 
quest for self-determination. Political liberation and 
philosophical liberation presuppose one another. 
In this discussion I shall try to shed some light on the 
problems attendant on African philosophers in their attempt 
to pose the question of African philosophy by examining 
the merits and demerits of one attempt to look at the 
question, that of Kwasi Wiredu in his influential and important 
work, Philosophy and an African Cultme. Wiredu's book, 
to my knowledge, was the first full-length study by an African 
philosopher to address the question of African philosophy 
in any systematic way. This fact alone establishes its 
importance and makes it worthy of serious attention. I 
would argue that its strengths and weaknesaes must be the 
subject qf careful scrutiny by African philosophers and others 
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Wiredu's book is, in effect, not a systematic study of 
the question of African philosophy, but rather a collection 
of essays, all but one of which have been published before 
in various journals. It is divided into three parts, and only 
the first part strictly lives up to the promise contained in 
the title of the book. Here the author discusses such topics 
as "On an African Orientation in Philosophy" and "What 
Can Philosophy Do for Africa ?11 • In the other two parts 
of the book Wiredu offers an excellent and balanced discussion 
of Marxism in the context of an examination of the notion 
of ideology. Here he tries to show what happens to philosophy 
when it becomes debased to the form of ideology and 
propaganda. In the third and final part of the book Wiredu 
focuses his attention on a central notion in philosophy, that 
of truth, and he offers a highly contentious theory of truth 
where truth is to be regarded as "justified opinion". This 
is a contentious theory because it seems to of fer little more 
than a subjectivist view of truth which is open to intellectual 
anarchism. If truth is no more than opinion then surely 
anyone's opinion is as good as anyone else's and therefore 
everyone's is true. Logically it seems to follow that 
everything is true and nothing is false, and therefore the 
concept of truth, unless it can somehow on objective grounds 
distinguish between truth and falsity, has to be abandoned 
in favour of expressed preferences. Is Wiredu's theory of 
truth not true but only his opinion? Wiredu offers an 
intelligent defence of his position that is sensitive to those 
questions, and, let it be said, he is entitled to his "opinion" I 
Throughout the book Wiredu passionately argues for 
a conception of philosophy that is pluralistic, self-critical, 
and open-minded, i.e. one which is the very opposite of 
dogmatism and authoritarianism or unjustified belief and 
opinion. To a certain extent his attempt is laudable and 
his criticism of those political ideologists who think that 
they and they alone have the correct conception of truth 
(p. 96) which can therefore justifiably be imposed on less 
enlightened folk is timely, especially when seen in the 
Ghanaian context in which Wiredu is writing. But it seems 
to me that as with all pluralistic conceptions of truth, which 
are very attractive on the surf ace, there is a fundamental 
problem with which Wiredu does not deal. This can be briefly 
stated as follows. The Clangers of absolutism and of absolute 
truth are well known. It leads to the kind of dogmatism 
and authoritarianism which Wiredu so astutely diagnoses 
in part two of his book. But what is frequently overlooked 
76 
K. Ansell-Pearson
by the liberal abandonment of claims to absolute or universal 
truth are the dangers and problems that follow from this 
seemingly tolerant viewpoint. Pluralism, which dissolves 
truth into a number of perspectives or viewpoints, all 
possessing equally valid claims to truthful and rightful 
existence, has no means or criteria for protecting against 
the coercive imposition of points of view. Thus, philosophical 
pluralism can lead to an arbitrariness which is even more 
dangerous and pernicious than the unity implicit in the concept 
of truth. If we abandon our lofty conception of truth, then 
we surrender it to whatever is believed or held to be true. 
The consequences of this for enlightened and rational thinking 
would be, I think, disastrous. Now Wiredu may respond to 
this objection by emphasising the distinction he makes between 
"justified" and "unjustified" opinion. But it does not take 
a discerning eye to notice that this distinction is only 
sophistical and that good reasons can always be given for 
holding any viewpoint or opinion. I shall not labour this 
point, however, but shall immediately proceed to an 
examination of Wiredu's conception of African philosophy 
and of the way in which he understands the role and function 
of philosophy in the context of an African culture, which 
is the ostensible theme of the book. 
Philosophy and an African Culture is an immensely 
readable book which is, throughout, a model of clarity. 
Wiredu's presentation is at all times clear and extremely 
well-argued, and this aspect of the book will make it 
particularly attractive to the student of philosophy or the 
layperson. It is in fact an excellent introduction to philosophy 
per se, regc;trdless of cultural affiliation, but for reasons 
that will soon become apparent it will be of particular interest 
to the African student of philosophy, and it will, if it has 
not done so already, deservedly establish itself as the standard 
textbook for courses in African philosophy that are taught 
in African institutions of higher education. I shall proceed 
in my examination of the book first by offering a presentation 
of its major arguments and secondly by offering what I hope 
are some pertinent and constructive criticisms of the book. 
The first part of Wiredu's book, the part which concerns 
us here, is divided into four sections, entitled (1) "Philosophy 
and an African Culture", (2.) "On an African Orientation 
in Philosophy", (3) "How Not to Compare African Traditional 
Thought with Western Thought", and (4) "What Can Philosophy 
Do for Africa?". The main arguments of each essay can 
be summarised as follows. 
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(1) In this essay Wiredu establishes an important and crucial 
point - that the question of African philosophy is not an 
anthropological one. This is an argument which receives 
extended treatment in the second essay and so· I shall leave 
a discussion of its importance until later. What emerges 
most clearly from this essay is Wiredu's conception of 
philosophy and the role he envisages it playing in African 
culture. Wiredu sees the main role of philosophy as lying 
in the task of providing the intellectual tools that are 
necessary for the adjustment from a predominantly traditional 
society to a modernised one. If mythical thought once served 
the needs and interests of traditional society, then logical 
and rigorous scientific thinking must serve those of a modern 
technological society. Philosophy, therefore, is the 
intellectµal means by which Africans can effect the 
tremendous changes involved in the transition from their 
traditional past. Wiredu writes: 
Contemporary Africa is in the middle 
of the transition from a traditional 
to a modern society. This process of 
modernisation entails changes not only 
in the physical environment but also 
in the mental outlook of our peoples, 
manifested both in their explicit beliefs 
and in their customs and their ordinary 
daily habits and pursuits. Since the 
fundamental rationale behind any changes 
in a world outlook is principally a philoso-
phical matter, it is plain that the philo-
sophical evaluation of our traditional 
thought is of very considerable relevance 
to the process of modernisation on 
our continent. (p. x) 
Wiredu argues that traditional societies are afflicted by 
several key factors which retard the process of modernisation. 
These factors, which he analyses in the context of his own 
native culture of Ghana, are anachronism, authoritarianism, 
and supernaturalism. The first relates to outmoded practices 
of social and cultural life, the second refers to the lack 
of autonomy and individuality in traditional societies, and 
the third, closely related to anachronism, relates to beliefs 
about the natural world that retard the development of 
a scientific understanding of the universe and man's place 
in it. Wiredu contends that the most basic and pervasive 
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anachronism which afflicts the development of his society 
is the unanalytical and unscientific attitude of mind. He 
thus proposes as a remedy that "Our children should be initi-
ated early in life into the discipline of formal and informal 
logic and into the methodology of rational thinking" (p. 
15). Philosophy, when seen in this context, can play an 
important and vital role in the process of reforming, adapting, 
and developing traditionQ;l culture (p. 16). Wiredu argues 
that it is not a question of arbitrarily destroying the fabric 
of traditional social life in the mere hope of something better 
or of submitting to an irrevocable destiny - modernisation. 
Rather, he goes on, it is a process of reconstruction where 
philosophy's duty is one of examining the intellectuai 
foundations of a society's culture (p. ZO). Africans, he argues, 
must subject their culture to a painful but necessary self-
criticism in their quest for autonomy in order that they 
may properly deal with their past and their future. 
(2) This essay attempts directly to confront the question: 
What is African philosophy? Wiredu begins by noting that 
in an African university a department of physics or engineering 
is unlikely to be asked to teach African physics or African 
engineering. Why, therefore, should it be regarded as 
necessary to establish a tradition of philosophy that is 
distinctly African in its orientation? The call for a 
specifically "African" philosophy to be established is a call 
that comes from a nationalist perspective and is voiced 
by educationalists, politicians, and governors of universities 
who regard it as politically sound and imperative that Africans 
should proudly develop their own unique tradition of thought 
and produce what P. O. Bondurin has described as "an 
autochthonous African species of their discipline" (Z). Wiredu 
sees the nationalist case as a just one - "in princ;:iple" (p. 
28). If there is Anglo-Saxon philosophy, American philosophy, 
Chinese philosophy, Indian philosophy, etc., why should there 
not be something known as "African" philosophy? But this 
presupposes the question of what African philosophy is and 
so throws the African philosopher back onto the problem 
of defining his/her activity. Wiredu and other African 
philosophers who have made similar attempts to probe this 
question are aware of the immense difficulties involved 
in providing an answer to it. What they have done is, quite 
rightly, to reject the ethnological approach that has dominated 
discussion of the question for a good part of this century, 
and which is typified by a work such as Rev. Father Placide 
Tempels' Bantu Philosophy (3). The great weakness of the 
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ethnological approach is that it treats the question purely 
in anthropological terms. That is to say, it attempts to 
define African philosophy in terms of some alleged collective 
unconscious of the African psyche or Weltanscbauung. The 
results reached by the early ethnographers and anthropologists 
in their investigations (it is important to note that many 
of them were clergymen whose interests were primarily 
religious) (4) were that the African mind was irrational 
and illogical; in a word, "primitive". The current attempts 
by African philosophers to define their activity must therefore 
be seen in terms of their reaction against this ethnocentrism 
and its implicit racism. It is racist, for example, because 
no respectable "British" philosopher would attempt to define 
"British" philosophy by referring to the British national 
character or psyche and the views of the common man who 
enjoys a talk and a pint on a Saturday night in an English 
pub. It is therefore regarded as an insult to Africans to 
try and attempt to define African philosophy by embarking 
on explorations into the African bush, tape recorder in hand, 
to record the philosophical opinions of the "natives". Another 
African philosopher, Paulin Houtondji, has expressed the 
point very well as follows: 
African philosophy does not lie where 
we have long been seeking it, in some 
mysterious corner of our supposedly 
immutable soul, a collective and uncon-
scious world-view which it is incumbent 
on us to study and revive, but ••• our 
philosophy consists essentially in the 
process of analysis itself, in that very 
discourse through which we have been 
doggedly attempting to define ourselves 
- a discourse, therefore, which we must 
recognise as ideological and which it 
is now up to us to liberate, in the most 
political sense of the word, in order 
to equip ourselves with a truly theoretical 
discourse which will be indissolubly 
philosophical and scientific. (5) 
Thus an essential task of the African philosopher is to put 
to rest once and for all the myth of ethnophilosophy which 
tries to give the missionary access "to the black man's soul" 
(6). However, could it not be argued that the call for a 
uniquely and specifically African philosophy by African 
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philosophers simply reinstates the problem of ethnocentricity? 
The answer must be No. There are several good reasons 
for this answer. While clearly recognising the dangers of 
an overly nationalist attempt to restrict philosophy to country 
or continent, African philosophers have argued that (a) African 
philosophy is no more, and no less, than a set of texts produced 
and written by philosophers who happen to be African, (b) 
every philosophy must have a tradition as is the case with 
attempts to establish American philosophy, Chinese 
philosophy, etc.- (c) philosophy is not definable in terms 
of the thought-content of the tradition or national origin 
of thinkers. All ideas that circulate in the world today are 
the products of a world-historical development and have 
been appropriated and transformed throughout time. Tradition 
is not something there that exists independently of us and 
which is hard and fixed for all time; as the quotation from 
Hegel that opened this essay suggests, it must be taken 
up, re-formed and used if it is to be a living tradition. On 
this point of ideas not being restricted to national origins 
Bondurin has astutely noted that "The thoughts of the ancient 
Greeks belong to the history of Western philosophy, but 
the ancient Greeks and Britons were mutually ignorant of 
each other. Caesar described the Britons as barbarians 
when he first went there" (7). Thus, it can be argued that 
while caution is needed here, specifically with respect to 
the nationalist concern, there is a great deal of value in 
attaching importance to the notion of African philosophy 
in that it is necessary in the struggle for independence and 
self-determination in all levels of life. The crucial difference 
today is that African philosophy is now being written not 
by missionary anthropologists and ethnographers but by 
African philosophers and mainly, though not exclusively, 
for Africans. (8) 
However, there still remains a major problem facing 
African philosophers in their attempts to answer the question 
of what is African philosophy, and this lies in the absence 
of a written tradition. Unlike his/her Anglo-Saxon, Chinese, 
or Indian counterparts, the African philosopher has no pre-
established written tradition in which to place his/her activity. 
While on one level this can be debilitating to the advancement 
of African philosophy, on another level it can be seen as 
a relatbrely minor problem. All that needs to be recognised 
is that African philosophy is a later fruit and that the term 
"African philosophy" can be usefully applied to define the 
body of work that African philosophers have been writing 
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over the past several decades. This should not be taken 
to mean that the oral tradition of wisdom of African sages, 
etc. is of no relevance and that the African philosopher 
should leave the question of its reception to the anthropo-
logist and historian. Thus, Wiredu himself answers the problem 
by arguing that the term "African philosophy" should be 
reserved for the results of the enterprise into the 
contemporary African experience: "African. philosophy," 
he writes, "as distinct from African traditional world-vie•s, 
is the philosophy that is being produced by contemporary 
African philosophers. It is still in the making" (p. 36). Thus 
the African philosopher is faced with a twofold task: he/she 
must on the one hand correct erroneous interpretations 
of his/her activity and on the other begin to create a tradition 
within which one can fruitfully pursue philosophical discourse 
and which can make an important contribution to world 
historical understanding as well as to the development of 
African culture. P.O. Bondurin has endorsed Wiredu's position 
on this point and has argued that while African philosophy 
may have some reference to an African context this is not 
a necessary condition for it to be regarded as 11 African" 
philosophy. "African philosophy" refers to the philosophical 
work done by African philosophers. (9) 
(3) Wiredu expands on these points in his third essay, "How 
Not to Compare African Traditional Thought with Western 
Thought". It is an excellently argued chapter and, in my 
opinion, one of the most successful of the whole book. Wiredu 
shows how until recently, and perhaps still in some quarters, 
African philosophy has been identified with traditional folk-
thought, and he succeeds in showing just how illegitimate 
this approach to the question of African philosophy is. He 
argues that "instead of seeing the basic non-scientific 
characteristics of African traditional thought as typifying 
traditional thought in general, Western anthropologists and 
others besides have mistakenly tended to take them as defining 
a particularly African way of thinking, with unfortunate 
effects" (p. 39) (10). A consequence of this, and one perhaps 
fatal to the development of mutual understanding amongst 
the different peoples of the world, is that one arriv~s at 
an exaggerated and distorted notion of the differences 
between Africans and peoples of the West. Wiredu argues 
that Africa, for its part, must overcome the superstition 
and conservatism of its former cultural heritage, and that 
Africans must not pay lip-service, for political or other 
reasons, to "the spirits of their ancestors under the impression 
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that in so doing they are demonstrating their faith in African 
culture" (p. 41). He is sensitive, too, to the immense problems 
involved in calling for the acceleration of the process 
technological and intellectual - of modernisation, which 
relates to the problem of identifying and separating the 
"backward" aspects of traditional culture from those aspects 
worth keeping. It is of course a problem that faces all 
communities and societies, and sometimes I think that Wiredu's 
argument in favour of modernisation of his continent is 
couched, against his declarations to the contrary, in terms 
of so.me inexorable logic and an unreserved optimism. I 
shall return to this point in my criticism later on. For his 
own part, Wiredu argues that the aspects of traditional culture 
worth keeping and preserving, though obviously in some 
modified form, are those which relate to morality and the 
ethical life of Africans. This is an aspect which one wishes 
Wiredu devoted more space to examining. As it is, questions 
of social and political philosophy, while he recognises their 
importance, receive scant attention in his treatment and 
at the expense of his call for the need for Africans to become 
logically and rationally minded. 
In this essay Wiredu makes several particularly perti-
nent points: one is that "rational knowledge" is not the 
preserve of the West and nor is superstition peculiar to the 
African, and, related to this, "the quest for development 
should be viewed as a continuing world-historical process 
in which all peoples, Western and non-Western alike, are 
engaged" (p. 43). Two, that anyone who wishes to compare 
African philosophy with its Western counterpart must do 
so by examining the philosophy that Africans are engaged 
in producing today. Because of their colonial heritage and 
lack of an indigenous philosophical tradition, African 
philosophers have no choice but to conduct their inquiries 
in relation to the established Western or other traditions. 
But a proper hermeneutic appreciation of tradition should 
make one realise that this is not simply a negative condition 
for the African philosopher in developing his/her activity 
and identity. Tradition becomes our own by critically engaging 
in it. There is no reason why African philosophers,. just 
like their Western counterparts, should not ·produce critical 
histories of Western philosophy. (11) 
(4) In the fourth and final essay of part one of the book Wiredu 
again takes up the theme he has discussed in the opening 
essay. His thinking here r1evolves around the question of 
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what philosophy can do for Africa. It should already be 
clear from the foregoing presentation of his bodk that the 
answer is unequivocally "a great deal". He argues that the 
question can only be properly answered by drawing attention 
to the "revolutionary" condition of modern Africa. Not 
only is Africa engaged in seeking models of social and political 
organisation that are suited to changed conditions of cultural 
life, but also it is engaged in the traumatic process of changing 
and adapting its traditional culture under the pressure of 
modernisation, and equally under the pressure of a colonial 
inheritance. This change in Africa will be in some places 
and at some times violent and destructive, and painful. 
It is in this chapter of the book that Wiredu addresses some 
questions of social and political philosophy and how they 
can have relevance to the problem of tnodernisation in Africa. 
He makes the fundamental point, for example, that 
"development" does not simply entail the acquisition of 
modern technology with its associated material benefits; 
equally important to "development" is "the securing of such 
conditions as shall permit the self-realisation of men as 
rational beings" (p. 53). He sees morality, in philosophical 
terms, as the humanistic pursuit of human well-being, and 
the ethical problem is how best to reconcile the conditions 
of the well-being of the individual with those of his/her 
community (p. 56). He concludes this essay and the first 
part of the book by arguing that what the African philosopher 
can do for his/her sodety is no different from what 
philosophers in other cultures do for their societies: "The 
function of philosophy everywhere is to examine the 
intellectual foundations of our life, using the best available 
modes of knowledge and reflection for human well-being". 
(p. 62) 
So far I have focused attention on presenting Wiredu's 
argument and emphasising its strengths. Its great merit 
is that it raises the question of African philosophy in a manner 
that is both lucid and provocative. But what of its 
weaknesses? I will attempt to argue in this section of the 
essay that the book's weaknesses stem largely from the 
model of philosophy that Wiredu uses to support his arguments. 
On p. 100 Wiredu defines philosophy as the free quest 
into the first and fundamental principles of huma:n life. 
He accepts an epistemological model of philosophy that 
receives its influence from the tradition of Anglo-Saxon 
analytical philosophy, in particular the philosophy developed 
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in the 1920's and 1930's known as logical positivism, whose 
chief exponent was A. J. Ayer (12). Wiredu regards it as 
a major strength of logical positivism that it sought a criterion 
by which one could legitimately distinguish between 
traditional, pre-scientific thought and modern, scientific 
thought (pp. 38-9). It found this criterion in what became 
known as the "verification principle". Logical positivism 
had a logical and scientistic bent which rested on empiricist 
grounds. Put simply, it argued that the criterion of truth 
and meaning resides in whether or not propositions are 
logically meaningful and whether or not they can be 
empirically verified by reference to experience and 
observation. It is perhaps ironic that Wiredu should accept 
logical positivism as a model of philosophy in the context 
of an African culture that is moving from a traditional, 
pre-scientific mode of thinking to a modern, scientific one, 
for it is the positivist approach which has become the subject 
of widespread criticism amongst philosophers in the West 
in recent times. It has been argued that the famous criterion 
for distinguishing meaningful propositions or statements 
from meaningless ones (science from metaphysics) is quite 
arbitrary and riddled with unexamined philosophical 
assumptions about the nature of knowing and truth. How, 
for example, can the verification principle establish and 
justify itself as a criterion of truth and meaning without 
presupposing its own truthfulness and meaningfulness? In 
other words, how can the verification principle verify itself? 
This is the problem of circularity which is common to all 
epistemological models of philosophy and which was the 
substance of Hegel's critique of Kant. (13) 
Moreover, it has been recognised by many philosophers 
for some time now that the consequences of accepting logical 
positivism as a model of philosophy are quite disastrous 
for philosophical inquiry as traditionally conceived. Philosophy 
becomes a scientific method and whole areas of philosophi-
cal inquiry are deemed "meaningless" - areas sll(:h as meta-
physics, ethics, and political philosophy, for example. ·Logical 
positivism was in fact responsible for a great deal of the 
barrenness that characterised much of the philosophy 
conducted for a large part of this century in British academic 
institutions, where it was e?TOneously believed that all 
philosophical problems were reducible to linguistic and logical 
matters. Thus, Wiredu's appreciation of logical positivism 
is fundamentally ahistorical and ignores the role that 
analytical philosophy bas played in the cultural life of Britain; 
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in particular, one needs to appreciate that this type of "ivory 
tower" philosophy only served the quietistic and conservative 
interests of the social and political status quo. Indeed, a 
theme that cWTently dominates much discussion of philosophy 
both in Britain and on the Continent is the crisis in which 
philosophy finds itself, which is seen to reflect a crisis of 
reason in the West. One tradition of_ Continental thinkers 
attributes this crisis to the fact that Western societies are 
dominated by a very restricted and technocratic model of 
what reason is, a model which is particularly reflected in 
scientistic logical positivism (14). Logical positivists regarded 
substantive questions of ethics and politics as no more than 
subjectivist expressions of taste. For example, they argued 
that the meaningfulness of ethical propositions simply lies 
in their emotive content (the doctrine that became known 
as 11 emotivism 11 ): to say that "X is right or good" is, according 
to this argument, to say no more than "I believe X is right 
or good, therefore you should do so as well." In other words, 
one expresses no more than one's personal dislikes and 
preferences and urges others to adopt them. This kind of 
thinking, however, makes a rational ethics impossible. (15) 
One of the weaknesses of Wiredu's argument about 
the need for Africans to become more logically and rationally 
minded is that his notion is infuriatingly vague. What kind 
of conception of reason does he have in mind? Is it simply 
an instrumentalist conception where one learns how to "think" 
in ternis of means and ends, causes and effects? The great 
weakness of logical positivism is that it reduces substantive 
questions about ethical and political life to a technical 
and instrumentalist conception of rationality that is not 
only restrictive but dogmatic (as is readily evident in its 
strict demarcation of "scientific" and "non-scientific" modes 
of thinking). Could it not be. argued, furthermore, that in 
this argument about the need for Africans to become logical 
and rational beings, Wiredu is colluding with his erstwhile 
colonisers in their entrenched beliefs that before the process 
of modernisation was effected by colonialism Africans were 
illogical and irrational, and that their culture and customs 
were founded on little more than superstition and lack of 
reason? 
I think there are serious problems in Wiredu's advocacy 
of logical positivism as a model of philosophical thinking 
to help solve the problems of contemporary African culture. 
It should be noted that the emotivism propounded by analytical 
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moral philosophers implies that ethics is little more than 
a species of subjectivism and irrationalism, and it is therefore 
quite at odds with Wiredu's emphasis on reason and rational 
inquiry and argument. Logical positivism proposes a highly 
restricted concept of rationality that is formal, not substan-
tive; factual, not normative. It raises a host of philosophical 
problems that it is quite unaware of due to the unexamined 
assumptions on which it rests. It rejects values in favour 
of facts, for example, but fails to recognise the normative 
basis of its own reasoning. 
Discussion of these problems in twentieth-century Anglo-
Saxon philosophy is almost entirely absent from Wiredu's 
presentation. The difficulties arising from an emphasis 
on reason unaccompanied by any specific concept of 
rationality are mentined only in a footnote on page 44, where 
Wiredu writes: "I am aware that my insistence on the 
overriding value of rationality will be found jarring by those 
Westerners who feel that the claims of rationality have 
been pushed too far in their countries and that the time 
is overdue for a return to "Nature" and the exultation in 
feeling, intuition, and immediacy. No doubt the harsh 
individualism of Western living might seem to lend support 
to this point of view. But in my opinion the trouble is due 
to too little rather than too much rationality in social 
organisation. This, however, is too large a topic to enter 
into here." But what is meant by rationality here? Increasing 
bureaucratic and scientific control of all areas of life? 
The management of social life by an elite of logiCal and 
rational intellectuals? A concern with developing a 
substantive concept of rationality in the context of 
contemporary African culture should not be regarded by 
Wiredu as extraneous or incidental to the African philosopher's 
aims and ambitions. The crisis of reason prevalent in Western 
societies today is largely the result of the near total adoption 
of the model of reason that Wiredu seems to be proposing 
as the solution to the anachronistic and backward ·nature 
of African society. I would repeat, therefore, that Wiredu's 
central argument on the relation between philosophy and 
an African culture is ahistorical. It should be noted that 
this criticism is directed towards all ahistorical conceptions 
of philosophy and not just Wiredu's "African" conception. 
It strikes me that Wiredu's otherwise admirable attempt 
to pose the question of African philosophy is marred by 
a lack of historical appreciation of the nature of Western 
philosophy. 
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A second major weakness of his book, in my view, is 
his failure to relate the advancement of African philosophy 
to the historical and political life, the struggles for political 
self-determination, of the African peoples. It is an historical 
appreciation of one's tradition, I would argue, that enables 
the philosopher to relate to it in a manner that is critical 
and fruitful and genuinely liberating. If African philosophers 
are to advocate the widespread adoption of reason as a central 
force in the life of their societies and as a way of overcoming 
what they regard as the anachronisms of African culture, 
then they need to cultivate an historical awareness of reason 
and of its relation to the development of Western capitalist 
societies which recognises the crisis of reason in the West 
today. If they don't, it seems to me that they are cultivating 
in their peoples philosophical ignorance and blindness. 
The reasons should now be clear as to why the question 
of African philosophy has dominated discussion in this area. 
This essay has attempted to make a contribution to the 
question by examining the merits and demerits of one parti-
cular approach to the question, an important and influential 
one. It is clear that what remains to be done on the part 
of African philosophers and others who are practising 
philosophy in Africa at the present time is the production 
and creation of a vibrant African philosophical culture. 
The question of African philosophy should no longer be 
regarded as some kind of special problem, or as if there 
were any doubt (which there was) that Africans were capable 
of doing philosophy in the first place. There are undoubtedly 
certain historical reasons for this lacuna which African 
philesophers have explored in their quest for autonomy. 
It is apparent that the question of African philosophy is 
as much an historical and political question as it is a purely 
philosophical one. In my opinion, it is a weakness of Wiredu's 
book that it fails to address the question of African philosophy 
in a way which concretely relates it to the historical and 
political heritage of modern Africa. 
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